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10-24-2001, 02:29 PM

proof of the Usa's aid in the supresion of democracy?... (this refers to the overthrowing of the democratically elected allende goverment in chile with the aid of Henry Kissinger)

• The Allende government had democratic legitimacy and ruled over a functioning democracy.

Allende ratified by parliament

Chile was a presidential democracy. Allende was elected President with a plurality of the vote, 36.2%, an established constitutional procedure. The outgoing President Frei resisted moves to block Allende’s investiture : it was ratified by a majority of the Chilean parliament. Allende signed a Statute of Guarantees in which he promised to uphold the Constitution and the legal system. There is evidence that he made extensive efforts to uphold it throughout the period, against increasing obstacles.

Subsequent free elections strengthened government support

In the 1971 municipal elections, the governing Popular Unity coalition won 51% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections of March 1973, it increased its electoral support to 40% of Senateseats and 43% of Congress seats, against an opposition block of parties with 55%. Chile’s presidential system (cf. the USA) did not require a minority government to seek wider support. But the lack of a majority meant that many government-sponsored bills were blocked by the opposition, and some non-government bills were passed because Allende did not use his veto.

Armed forces’ acceptance of the government

The Chilean armed forces, in line with its duty to obey civilian governments, had a strong constitutional tradition, but a minority of officers (whom Pinochet later joined) struggled repeatedly to subvert it. At the time of Allende’s victory, extreme right-wing conspirators around Gen. Viaux made a bungled attempt to kidnap the head of the army, the constitutionalist Gen. Schneider, killing him instead. But the armed forces backed Allende. High ranking army generals joined Allende’s cabinet from November 1972 until March 1973 and again from 10 August 1973 until the coup. Pinochet duped Allende into believing he too was a loyalist.

• Evidence that the right-wing parties accepted the subversion of democracy and the overthrow of an elected government when it ceased to work in their favour.

This is the indictment of the leading US authority on Chile, Georgetown University professor Arturo Valenzuela.

It was the establishment elites who became determined to use force when constitutional procedure failed to remove the government. The US Senate Committee charged with investigating US involvement in Chile, chaired by Senator Frank Church, reported in 1974-5 that a secret group assembled by Henry Kissinger had financially supported many Chilean opposition organizations to sustain lengthy actions aimed at destabilizing the government.

• Allende government was not involved in terrorism (creating a climate of fear to destabilize the government); right-wing opposition groups were.

The US Senate Church Committee report concluded that the far right-wing party Patria y Libertad received finance to destabilize the country through bomb attacks and actions described as ‘terrorist’. Le Monde reported 500 right-wing attacks were committed in the 2-week period of late August-early September 1973, while the government parties appealed for calm.

• Legal basis for Allende Reform programme.

Takeovers by workers could be carried out under a Chilean law allowing ‘requisition’ of factories to force continuity of production, there where owners had been found to be reducing production and de-investing to create shortages of goods. The Land Reform law passed by Christian Democrats was the framework for agricultural labourers to occupy land if it was uncultivated or underused.

Allende’s intention was a specifically Chilean, constitutional road to ‘socialism’, even though some workers and peasants, who had little stake in a democracy that had served them poorly, pushed the boundaries of action beyond what the government intended. While the government’s reform programme was lawful, there were violations of the spirit of the law. The left’s abuses were sporadic and undirected and on a minor scale compared to those of the right, who repeatedly violated specific statutes while calling for ‘law and order’ in general.

• Government did not allow civilians to hold arms.

Armed forces’ power to search for arms.

The army was given the legal power to search freely for arms after parliament passed a bill in Oct. 1972. Searches in factories and among government supporters found very few. He called a state of emergency in May 1973, revoked all civilian gun permits and banned unauthorised public meetings. After the failed coup attempt of 29 June 1973, supporters called on the government to open the armouries to them, so that they could come to the government's defence, but Allende refused.

So when Pinochet made the coup, there was little armed resistance, because Allende had not encouraged it. Allegations of Cuban advisors and trained militia and a ‘Plan Z’ were proved false and were dropped by Pinochet quite early, without any evidence.

1973 : STEPS IN THE OVERTHROW OF A DEMOCRACY

• Economic disruption perpetrated by rightist trade unions

April 1973 : Right-wing trade unions launched strikes with intent to drain the Treasury of income.

Copper mines were Chile’s main source of wealth and foreign exchange income. In 1971 they were nationalised by a majority of Parliament with Christian Democrat support, as a major national asset.

Despite this on 19 April 1973, a 74-day miners’ strike (financed by the CIA) was orchestrated by the right-wing parties. It lost the state $70-100 million dollars in forgone revenue. The Christian Democrat-dominated miner’s union claimed a 41% pay increase, but the Miners’ Conciliation Board ruled (in favour of the government) that the miners were not entitled to it. Disregarding this, the Christian Democrat and National Party called for the strike. In early May, the government achieved a settlement and the majority of workers went back to work, but a hard core stayed out on strike. On 14 June they started a long march from the north to Santiago, supported by food and transport from landowners and rightist parties. Still Allende negotiated with the strikers, who gave up on 29 June ‘73 after the failed military coup.

• Army high command remained loyal to the President and constitutional order until just before the coup; opposition parties did not.

29 June 1973 : Failed military coup.

The attempt by the Second Armoured Regiment to stage a coup failed because most of the army did not join it. The rebellion was put down by the joint chiefs of staff killing 22 insurgents. Immediately after the failed 29 June coup, the 5 leaders of the extreme-right Fatherland and Freedom party (allowed to operate in Allende’s liberal democracy) sought political asylum in a foreign embassy as they had been part of the plotters. The chairman of the National Party, Mr Onofre Jarpa, himself went to the airport to see them off into exile. The Christian Democrat Party’s chairman did not condemn the coup attempt.

• Provocation and planned sabotage carried out by anti-Allende groups.

July 1973 : lorry-owners’ strike.

A political strike was launched on 26 July 1973 by the lorry-owners, with rightist parties’ support and CIA finance. The head of one lorry-owners’ organization who stayed loyal to the government, was assassinated. Lorries blocked all main arterial roads disrupting nation-wide food distribution, and sabotaged the lorries themselves by removing vital parts.

The government accepted 13 of their 14 demands yet they stayed on strike.

• No evidence whatsoever that Allende government ordered or condoned the practise of torture.

July-August 1973: Major case of torture by the Navy,

No torture allegations were made against the Allende government at the time. Nor is there evidence that it authorised or covered up the practise of torture by the police or any branch of the armed forces. On the contrary, the Navy was publicly accused of torturing a group of about 100 arrested sailors and workers, in order to make them confess that they had ‘conspired’ to stay loyal (sic) to the government in the event of an unconstitutional military move. (The loyalist group had formed as a response to their Navy colleagues’ conspiring to bring about such a military coup, but these were not arrested.)

On 5 September 1973 all government parties issued a statement denouncing such torture.

The Navy headed by Admiral Merino, played a major part in 11 September coup, which started with the naval uprising in Valparaiso.

‘The silent majority’ supported peaceful outcome to crisis.

September 1973 : Despite anti-government protest activity on the part of groups such as professionals and housewives from residential suburbs, national surveys taken in the weeks before the coup indicated substantial majority support for democracy and a peaceful outcome to the political crisis. Only 27% of those polled even thought the military should be ‘involved in the political process’ in someway .

• Army intervention did not uphold constitutional procedures

September 11th, 1973 : The armed forces could have limited their action to removing the government and calling new elections, which the right-wing parties could have won. Equally, the armed forces could have restored law and order, since resistance to the coup was minimal after the first few days. The military coup need not have led to dictatorship, it was Pinochet’s decision to remain in power.

• Bloodshed, torture and arbitrary imprisonment were wholly unnecessary for the coup’s success.

After the coup: Rather than maintaining law and order, the Junta disrupted all democratic institutions and practices, and for years after the coup, persecuted countless individuals and parties suspected of sympathy with the previous government. Pinochet’s Junta threw out Constitutional procedures and suspended human rights guarantees such as habeas corpus, and killed thousands in revenge for past actions which had been lawful at the time they were carried out. Yet Allende’s unarmed supporters posed no threat whatsoever.

• Unnecessary dictatorship, pointless loss of life.

Even from the point of view of the coup’s supporters, once the Allende government had been brought down, Pinochet’s subsequent dictatorship was unnecessary as well as unjustified. Yet instead of calling elections, in June 1974 Pinochet declared himself President of the Republic and Supreme Chief of the Nation, personal ambition outstripping all other considerations.

10-24-2001, 02:29 PM	#17
Dramnek_Ulk Guest Posts: n/a	proof of the Usa's aid in the supresion of democracy?... (this refers to the overthrowing of the democratically elected allende goverment in chile with the aid of Henry Kissinger) • The Allende government had democratic legitimacy and ruled over a functioning democracy. Allende ratified by parliament Chile was a presidential democracy. Allende was elected President with a plurality of the vote, 36.2%, an established constitutional procedure. The outgoing President Frei resisted moves to block Allende’s investiture : it was ratified by a majority of the Chilean parliament. Allende signed a Statute of Guarantees in which he promised to uphold the Constitution and the legal system. There is evidence that he made extensive efforts to uphold it throughout the period, against increasing obstacles. Subsequent free elections strengthened government support In the 1971 municipal elections, the governing Popular Unity coalition won 51% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections of March 1973, it increased its electoral support to 40% of Senateseats and 43% of Congress seats, against an opposition block of parties with 55%. Chile’s presidential system (cf. the USA) did not require a minority government to seek wider support. But the lack of a majority meant that many government-sponsored bills were blocked by the opposition, and some non-government bills were passed because Allende did not use his veto. Armed forces’ acceptance of the government The Chilean armed forces, in line with its duty to obey civilian governments, had a strong constitutional tradition, but a minority of officers (whom Pinochet later joined) struggled repeatedly to subvert it. At the time of Allende’s victory, extreme right-wing conspirators around Gen. Viaux made a bungled attempt to kidnap the head of the army, the constitutionalist Gen. Schneider, killing him instead. But the armed forces backed Allende. High ranking army generals joined Allende’s cabinet from November 1972 until March 1973 and again from 10 August 1973 until the coup. Pinochet duped Allende into believing he too was a loyalist. • Evidence that the right-wing parties accepted the subversion of democracy and the overthrow of an elected government when it ceased to work in their favour. This is the indictment of the leading US authority on Chile, Georgetown University professor Arturo Valenzuela. It was the establishment elites who became determined to use force when constitutional procedure failed to remove the government. The US Senate Committee charged with investigating US involvement in Chile, chaired by Senator Frank Church, reported in 1974-5 that a secret group assembled by Henry Kissinger had financially supported many Chilean opposition organizations to sustain lengthy actions aimed at destabilizing the government. • Allende government was not involved in terrorism (creating a climate of fear to destabilize the government); right-wing opposition groups were. The US Senate Church Committee report concluded that the far right-wing party Patria y Libertad received finance to destabilize the country through bomb attacks and actions described as ‘terrorist’. Le Monde reported 500 right-wing attacks were committed in the 2-week period of late August-early September 1973, while the government parties appealed for calm. • Legal basis for Allende Reform programme. Takeovers by workers could be carried out under a Chilean law allowing ‘requisition’ of factories to force continuity of production, there where owners had been found to be reducing production and de-investing to create shortages of goods. The Land Reform law passed by Christian Democrats was the framework for agricultural labourers to occupy land if it was uncultivated or underused. Allende’s intention was a specifically Chilean, constitutional road to ‘socialism’, even though some workers and peasants, who had little stake in a democracy that had served them poorly, pushed the boundaries of action beyond what the government intended. While the government’s reform programme was lawful, there were violations of the spirit of the law. The left’s abuses were sporadic and undirected and on a minor scale compared to those of the right, who repeatedly violated specific statutes while calling for ‘law and order’ in general. • Government did not allow civilians to hold arms. Armed forces’ power to search for arms. The army was given the legal power to search freely for arms after parliament passed a bill in Oct. 1972. Searches in factories and among government supporters found very few. He called a state of emergency in May 1973, revoked all civilian gun permits and banned unauthorised public meetings. After the failed coup attempt of 29 June 1973, supporters called on the government to open the armouries to them, so that they could come to the government's defence, but Allende refused. So when Pinochet made the coup, there was little armed resistance, because Allende had not encouraged it. Allegations of Cuban advisors and trained militia and a ‘Plan Z’ were proved false and were dropped by Pinochet quite early, without any evidence. 1973 : STEPS IN THE OVERTHROW OF A DEMOCRACY • Economic disruption perpetrated by rightist trade unions April 1973 : Right-wing trade unions launched strikes with intent to drain the Treasury of income. Copper mines were Chile’s main source of wealth and foreign exchange income. In 1971 they were nationalised by a majority of Parliament with Christian Democrat support, as a major national asset. Despite this on 19 April 1973, a 74-day miners’ strike (financed by the CIA) was orchestrated by the right-wing parties. It lost the state $70-100 million dollars in forgone revenue. The Christian Democrat-dominated miner’s union claimed a 41% pay increase, but the Miners’ Conciliation Board ruled (in favour of the government) that the miners were not entitled to it. Disregarding this, the Christian Democrat and National Party called for the strike. In early May, the government achieved a settlement and the majority of workers went back to work, but a hard core stayed out on strike. On 14 June they started a long march from the north to Santiago, supported by food and transport from landowners and rightist parties. Still Allende negotiated with the strikers, who gave up on 29 June ‘73 after the failed military coup. • Army high command remained loyal to the President and constitutional order until just before the coup; opposition parties did not. 29 June 1973 : Failed military coup. The attempt by the Second Armoured Regiment to stage a coup failed because most of the army did not join it. The rebellion was put down by the joint chiefs of staff killing 22 insurgents. Immediately after the failed 29 June coup, the 5 leaders of the extreme-right Fatherland and Freedom party (allowed to operate in Allende’s liberal democracy) sought political asylum in a foreign embassy as they had been part of the plotters. The chairman of the National Party, Mr Onofre Jarpa, himself went to the airport to see them off into exile. The Christian Democrat Party’s chairman did not condemn the coup attempt. • Provocation and planned sabotage carried out by anti-Allende groups. July 1973 : lorry-owners’ strike. A political strike was launched on 26 July 1973 by the lorry-owners, with rightist parties’ support and CIA finance. The head of one lorry-owners’ organization who stayed loyal to the government, was assassinated. Lorries blocked all main arterial roads disrupting nation-wide food distribution, and sabotaged the lorries themselves by removing vital parts. The government accepted 13 of their 14 demands yet they stayed on strike. • No evidence whatsoever that Allende government ordered or condoned the practise of torture. July-August 1973: Major case of torture by the Navy, No torture allegations were made against the Allende government at the time. Nor is there evidence that it authorised or covered up the practise of torture by the police or any branch of the armed forces. On the contrary, the Navy was publicly accused of torturing a group of about 100 arrested sailors and workers, in order to make them confess that they had ‘conspired’ to stay loyal (sic) to the government in the event of an unconstitutional military move. (The loyalist group had formed as a response to their Navy colleagues’ conspiring to bring about such a military coup, but these were not arrested.) On 5 September 1973 all government parties issued a statement denouncing such torture. The Navy headed by Admiral Merino, played a major part in 11 September coup, which started with the naval uprising in Valparaiso. ‘The silent majority’ supported peaceful outcome to crisis. September 1973 : Despite anti-government protest activity on the part of groups such as professionals and housewives from residential suburbs, national surveys taken in the weeks before the coup indicated substantial majority support for democracy and a peaceful outcome to the political crisis. Only 27% of those polled even thought the military should be ‘involved in the political process’ in someway . • Army intervention did not uphold constitutional procedures September 11th, 1973 : The armed forces could have limited their action to removing the government and calling new elections, which the right-wing parties could have won. Equally, the armed forces could have restored law and order, since resistance to the coup was minimal after the first few days. The military coup need not have led to dictatorship, it was Pinochet’s decision to remain in power. • Bloodshed, torture and arbitrary imprisonment were wholly unnecessary for the coup’s success. After the coup: Rather than maintaining law and order, the Junta disrupted all democratic institutions and practices, and for years after the coup, persecuted countless individuals and parties suspected of sympathy with the previous government. Pinochet’s Junta threw out Constitutional procedures and suspended human rights guarantees such as habeas corpus, and killed thousands in revenge for past actions which had been lawful at the time they were carried out. Yet Allende’s unarmed supporters posed no threat whatsoever. • Unnecessary dictatorship, pointless loss of life. Even from the point of view of the coup’s supporters, once the Allende government had been brought down, Pinochet’s subsequent dictatorship was unnecessary as well as unjustified. Yet instead of calling elections, in June 1974 Pinochet declared himself President of the Republic and Supreme Chief of the Nation, personal ambition outstripping all other considerations.