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Grendal · 08-26-2003, 12:11 PM

PAUL RECER
Canadian Press

Tuesday, August 26, 2003
ADVERTISEMENT

WASHINGTON (AP) - The destruction of space shuttle Columbia and the death of its seven astronauts were caused by a NASA culture driven by schedule, starved for funds and burdened with an eroded, insufficient safety program, investigators said Tuesday.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in a wide-ranging analysis of decades of NASA history, said the space agency's attitude toward safety is little improved since the 1986 Challenger disaster, which also killed seven.

"The board strongly believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set for another accident," the report said.

In events leading up to the loss of Columbia, the report said, NASA mission managers fell into the habit of accepting as normal some flaws in the shuttle system and tended to ignore or not recognize that these problems could foreshadow catastrophe.

This was an "echo" of some root causes of the Challenger accident, the board said.

"These repeating patterns mean that flawed practices embedded in NASA's organizational system continued for 20 years and made substantial contributions to both accidents," the 248-page report said.

During Columbia's last mission, NASA managers missed opportunities to evaluate possible damage to the craft's heat shield from a strike on the left wing by flying foam insulation. Such insulation strikes had occurred on previous missions and the report said NASA managers had come to view them as an acceptable abnormality that posed no safety risk.

This attitude also contributed to the lack of interest in getting spy satellite photos of Columbia, images that might have identified the extent of damage on the shuttle, and led to incorrect conclusions.

But most of all, the report noted, there was "ineffective leadership" that "failed to fulfil the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew."

Management techniques in NASA, the report said, discouraged dissenting views on safety issues and ultimately created "blind spots" about the risk to the space shuttle of the foam insulation impact.

Throughout its history, the report found, "NASA has consistently struggled to achieve viable safety programs" but the agency effort "has fallen short of its mark."

Sean O'Keefe, who heads the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, had warned space workers earlier this summer that they should prepare themselves for a report that will be "really ugly" as it outlines flawed engineering decisions that led to the destruction of Columbia as it returned to Earth following a 16-day mission.

O'Keefe said Monday that he was telling space workers "we need to not be defensive about that and try to not take it as a personal affront."

Rather, he said, they should view it as a road map for getting the shuttle back into orbit.

The board made 29 recommendations, including changes it said NASA must make to start flying again and long-range changes that will alter the space agency culture.

"The changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish - and will be internally resisted," the report said.

Some blame in the report was shifted to Congress and the White House because for almost a decade NASA lived on a lean budget that actually lost 13 per cent of its purchasing power from 1993 to 2002.

At the same time, NASA was under pressure to build the International Space Station. To cut costs, the agency reduced its staff and contractor workforce from about 32,000 in 1991 to just over 19,000 in 1997.

"The White House, Congress and NASA leadership exerted constant pressure to reduce or at least freeze operating costs (for the space shuttle)," the report said. As a result, "safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and Shuttle infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate."

At another point, the report noted: "Little by little, NASA was accepting more and more risk in order to stay on schedule." Also: "The program was operating too close to too many margins."

08-26-2003, 12:11 PM	#1
Grendal Manshoon Join Date: June 18, 2003 Location: Vancouver Age: 58 Posts: 220	PAUL RECER Canadian Press Tuesday, August 26, 2003 ADVERTISEMENT WASHINGTON (AP) - The destruction of space shuttle Columbia and the death of its seven astronauts were caused by a NASA culture driven by schedule, starved for funds and burdened with an eroded, insufficient safety program, investigators said Tuesday. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in a wide-ranging analysis of decades of NASA history, said the space agency's attitude toward safety is little improved since the 1986 Challenger disaster, which also killed seven. "The board strongly believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set for another accident," the report said. In events leading up to the loss of Columbia, the report said, NASA mission managers fell into the habit of accepting as normal some flaws in the shuttle system and tended to ignore or not recognize that these problems could foreshadow catastrophe. This was an "echo" of some root causes of the Challenger accident, the board said. "These repeating patterns mean that flawed practices embedded in NASA's organizational system continued for 20 years and made substantial contributions to both accidents," the 248-page report said. During Columbia's last mission, NASA managers missed opportunities to evaluate possible damage to the craft's heat shield from a strike on the left wing by flying foam insulation. Such insulation strikes had occurred on previous missions and the report said NASA managers had come to view them as an acceptable abnormality that posed no safety risk. This attitude also contributed to the lack of interest in getting spy satellite photos of Columbia, images that might have identified the extent of damage on the shuttle, and led to incorrect conclusions. But most of all, the report noted, there was "ineffective leadership" that "failed to fulfil the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew." Management techniques in NASA, the report said, discouraged dissenting views on safety issues and ultimately created "blind spots" about the risk to the space shuttle of the foam insulation impact. Throughout its history, the report found, "NASA has consistently struggled to achieve viable safety programs" but the agency effort "has fallen short of its mark." Sean O'Keefe, who heads the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, had warned space workers earlier this summer that they should prepare themselves for a report that will be "really ugly" as it outlines flawed engineering decisions that led to the destruction of Columbia as it returned to Earth following a 16-day mission. O'Keefe said Monday that he was telling space workers "we need to not be defensive about that and try to not take it as a personal affront." Rather, he said, they should view it as a road map for getting the shuttle back into orbit. The board made 29 recommendations, including changes it said NASA must make to start flying again and long-range changes that will alter the space agency culture. "The changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish - and will be internally resisted," the report said. Some blame in the report was shifted to Congress and the White House because for almost a decade NASA lived on a lean budget that actually lost 13 per cent of its purchasing power from 1993 to 2002. At the same time, NASA was under pressure to build the International Space Station. To cut costs, the agency reduced its staff and contractor workforce from about 32,000 in 1991 to just over 19,000 in 1997. "The White House, Congress and NASA leadership exerted constant pressure to reduce or at least freeze operating costs (for the space shuttle)," the report said. As a result, "safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and Shuttle infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate." At another point, the report noted: "Little by little, NASA was accepting more and more risk in order to stay on schedule." Also: "The program was operating too close to too many margins." __________________ When all else fails READ THE DIRECTIONS!