In my opinion the Germans forfeited any chance of winning the war by not going forward with Operation Zeelöwe after concluding the French campaign. At that time the Royal Navy was weaker than ever after Norwegian setbacks and the Dunkerque evacutation. Furthermore the RN was built and set for blue water combat and not channel patrols. A mere handful of destroyers were in Southampton. The British were rattled. The BEF was still in shambles. I am not saying that an invasion would have been a guaranteed success, but it was certainly a better shot than going against the Russians with the Brits undefeated. However Göring promised that he could bomb Britain to submission without a shred of evidence that such a plan was feasible.
The Germans made numerous mistakes, but the most important is that they went to war prematurely. People often have a vision of Germany being fully prepared for war at 1939, but that is hardly the case. In fact the projected year for war was in the mid 1940'es where the Luftwaffe, Panzer and most importantly the Kriegsmarine would have been fully equiped. The Germans was not in war industry at all even though they started the war. They were still producing volkswagens rather than tanks all the way up to and including 1941. If the Germans had produced the same quantities of tanks and mechanized personel carriers in 1939-1941 as they did in the later years of the war (where they were beginning to suffer from RAF/USAAF bomber attacks) they may have stood a better chance. Meaning they would not have lost quite so fast.
The reason why the Germans penetrated so fast and so deep into Russia during the initial stage of Barbarossa was that the Russian forces were preparing to attack themselves. This is not mere speculation, but backed by evidence*. The date for invasion was 10th of July - just two and a half week after the German attack commenced on June 22nd. So bear no illusions - a German-Soviet war was inevitable.
One of the most fundamental principles of war is that a military operation must identify and maintain one and only one objective. Barbarossa did have such a goal, but the supreme command (mainly Hitler who along with Göring had the skills of a battalion commander) failed to maintain it. The operations in Russia shifted back and forward without maintaining a drive. Suddenly the advance on Moscow is halted to shift army corps down to Ukraine for some encirclement (that failed because the Fallschrimjägers had been burned off at a redundant operation in Crete). Blatant mistakes in a campaign were time was of the essence.
Another crucial error on the German side was a lack of priority to Military Intelligence.
* V. Sukorov, RUSI Journal, June 1985. Second hand quote.
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[url]\"http://www.dsr.kvl.dk/~maddog/isur.jpg\" target=\"_blank\">Ooooookay. I surrender.</a><br />Sometimes I get the eerie feeling that my computer is operating me and not the other way around.
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